http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/magazine/13JStreet-t.html?_r=1&emc=eta1Gavin Bond for The New York Times By JAMES TRAUB Published: September 9, 2009 In July, President
Obama met for 45 minutes with
leaders of American Jewish organizations. All presidents
meet with Israels advocates. Obama, however, had
taken his time, and powerhouse figures of the Jewish
community were grumbling; Obamas coolness seemed to
be of a piece with his willingness to publicly pressure
Israel to freeze the growth of its settlements and with
what was deemed his excessive solicitude toward the
plight of the Palestinians. During the July meeting, held in the Roosevelt
Room, Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations, told Obama that public disharmony
between Israel and the U.S. is beneficial to
neither and that differences should be dealt
with directly by the parties. The president,
according to Hoenlein, leaned back in his chair and said:
I disagree. We had eight years of no daylight
between George W. Bush and
successive Israeli governments and no
progress. It is safe to say that at least one
participant in the meeting enjoyed this exchange
immensely: Jeremy Ben-Ami, the founder and executive
director of J Street, a year-old lobbying group with
progressive views on Israel. Some of the mainstream
groups vehemently protested the White House decision to
invite J Street, which they regard as a marginal
organization located well beyond the consensus that they
themselves seek to enforce. But J Street shares the Obama
administrations agenda, and the invitation stayed.
Ben-Ami didnt say a word at the meeting he
is aware of J Streets neophyte status but
afterward he was quoted extensively in the press, which
vexed the mainstream groups all over again. J Street does
not accept the public harmony rule any more
than Obama does. In a conversation a month before the
White House session, Ben-Ami explained to me:
Were trying to redefine what it means to be
pro-Israel. You dont have to be noncritical. You
dont have to adopt the party line. Its not,
Israel, right or wrong. There appears to be an appetite for J
Streets approach. Over the last year, J
Streets budget has doubled, to $3 million; its
lobbying staff is doubling as well, to six. That still
makes it tiny compared with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or Aipac, whose lobbying prowess is a matter
of Washington legend. J Street is still as much an
Internet presence, launching volleys of e-mail messages
from the netroots, as it is a shoe-leather operation. But
it has arrived at a propitious moment, for President
Obama, unlike his predecessors, decided to push hard for
a Mideast peace settlement from the very outset of his
tenure. He appointed George Mitchell as his negotiator,
and Mitchell has tried to wring painful concessions from
Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states. In the case
of Israel, this means freezing settlements and accepting
a two-state solution. Obama needs the political space at
home to make that case; he needs Congress to resist Prime
Minister The idea that there is an Israel
lobby, with its undertones of dual loyalty, is a
controversial notion. It has been around since the early
1970s at least, but it became a topic of wide discussion
only after the publication of a notorious article in The
London Review of Books in 2006 by the political
scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. The article,
which was expanded into a book, infuriated many readers
by its air of conspiratorial hugger-mugger; by its
insistence that Jewish neoconservatives had persuaded
President Bush to go to war in Iraq in order to protect
Israel; and by the authors apparent ignorance of
the deep sense of identification many Americans
Jewish and gentile feel toward Israel. But the
authors made one claim that struck many knowledgeable
people as very close to the mark: The Israel lobby had
succeeded in ruling almost any criticism of Israel out of
bounds, especially in Congress. The bottom line,
Mearsheimer and Walt wrote, is that Aipac, a de
facto agent for a foreign government, has a stranglehold
on Congress, with the result that U.S. policy is not
debated there, even though that policy has important
consequences for the entire world. Mearsheimer and
Walt also wrote that Aipac and other groups succeeded in
installing officials who were deemed pro-Israel
into senior positions. This is, of course, what effective
lobbies do. The Cuba lobby, for example, long operated in
the same way. But Israel is a much more important
American national-security interest than Cuba. No country,
whether Israel or Cuba, has identical interests to those
of the United States. And yet mainstream American Jewish
groups had implicitly agreed to subordinate their own
views to those of the government in Jerusalem. The
watchword, says J. J. Goldberg, editorial director of The
Forward, the Jewish weekly, was, We stick with
Israel regardless of our own judgment. American Jewish voters are
overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic, but as Jewish
groups moved to the right along with Israel in the 1980s,
the groups increasingly made common cause with the Republican Party,
which from the time of Ronald Reagan was seen
as more staunchly pro-Israel than were the Democrats.
Jewish groups also began to work with the evangelicals
who formed the Republican base and tended to be fervidly
pro-Israel. Indeed, when I met with Malcolm Hoenlein in
July, he had just come from a huge Washington rally
sponsored by Christians United for Israel, whose founder,
the Rev. John
Hagee, has denounced
Catholicism, Islam and homosexuality in such violent
terms that John
McCain felt compelled
eventually to reject his endorsement during the 2008
presidential campaign. George W. Bush shared the views of the
mainstream groups on Israel and Palestine, on Iran and on
the threat of Islamic extremism. Doug Bloomfield, who
served as legislative director for Aipac in the 1980s
and who was pushed out, he says, for being
too pro-peace describes Aipac and
other groups as very sycophantic toward the Bush
administration. Aipac and other groups found little
to criticize in a president who, unlike Bill
Clinton, did not believe in
pushing Jerusalem to make serious compromises to achieve
peace. President Bush, in this view, was the best
president either Israels Likud leadership or the
mainstream Jewish groups could have wished for. And it was precisely this success that
began to loosen the stranglehold described by
Mearsheimer and Walt. As Martin Indyk, a former
American ambassador to Israel and now the director of
foreign policy at the Brookings Institution,
puts it, In the Bush years, when Israel enjoyed a
blank check, increasing numbers of people in the Jewish
and pro-Israel community began to wonder, If this was the
best president Israel ever had, how come Israels
circumstances seemed to be deteriorating so rapidly?
Why was Israel more diplomatically isolated than ever?
Why had Israel fought a savage and apparently unavailing
war with Hezbollah in Lebanon? Why were the Islamists of Hamas gaining the upper hand over the more moderate Fatah in Palestine? There was kind of a
cognitive dissonance, Indyk says, about
whether a blank check for Israel is necessarily the best
way to secure the longevity of the Jewish state. James Traub, a contributing writer for
the magazine, is the author most recently of The
Freedom Agenda.
Israel Has Nuked Itself
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