External factors have been and still are a
decisive factor in shaping internal political
developments of the Arab region. Over the past
two centuries, radical changes always came as a
result of western pressure. Today, the crucial
question revolves around how legitimate western
intervention can be in light of the blatant
failure of the US and its western allies to
export democracy either in Iraq or Afghanistan.
The West should limit its support to the moral
and political dimensions of the political
transition in the Arab states, but should not
exclude resorting to some coercive means such as
conditional linkage. Western recent actions
reflect a lack of understanding of Middle-Eastern
complexities and renewed complacency vis-à-vis
authoritarian practices. The West must realize
that opposition movements are peaceful for now,
but if they are suppressed, there is no guarantee
that the next wave of opposition will remain
committed to a peaceful path. The Egyptian
example shows that the basic concern of the US is
not about democracy or non-democracy but about
Islamists or non-Islamists. The only way to
restrain Islamist forces is to allow them to
participate in a full-fledged democracy, but the
inclusion of Islamist movements in the democratic
process should be left to domestic forces as an
internal matter.It is quite
difficult to analyze the political situation in
the Arab world, indeed in the entire Islamic
world, in isolation from external factors. The
crucial question revolves around how legitimate
it is to speak of western penetration, in
particular with regard to the internal political
developments of the Arab region. In this regard,
the historical dimension is of great importance.
From the middle of the 19th
Century, when the decline of the Ottoman Empire
was in full swing, until today, it is impossible
to explain the developments taking place in the
Arab and Islamic world in isolation from the
European world and from external interference. I
dont subscribe to the ideas of the Dependency
School, which explains everything in the
Third World in terms of the economic interests of
the West. My perspective is political, based on
actual facts.
Likewise, it is not possible to
explain the emergence of the Arab entities in
isolation from the implications of colonialism.
Colonialist policy and intervention created the
modern Arab state entities such as Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, and so on. The European role in
supporting the Great Arab Revolt of Sharif
Hussein against the Turks is well known, as is
the European support of the project to establish
the Saudi state, it is also impossible to dismiss
the fact that Britain and the other European
powers came in with their plan to partition
Palestine and set up Israel in the heart of the
Arab world. Moreover, it was Britain that came up
with the idea of the Arab League. Claims that
Arab nationalist struggles could explain the
emergence of the Arab League must be looked at
for what they really are worth. Britain actually
wanted to establish a sort of balance, offsetting
the creation of Israel in Palestine. In fact,
London triggered the process by initiating the
Balfour Declaration, followed by Churchill who
adopted the Arab League project.
Thus it is impossible to separate
internal developments in the Arab region from the
impact of colonialist activities on the one hand
and from western activities on the other.
The Egyptian example
If we take Egypt as an example
insofar as its domestic developments are
concerned, we will find that the impact of the
external factor was sweeping. Egypt was a colony
or rather a protectorate of Britain when the
First World War broke out, and wartime conditions
set back the countrys internal development.
What encouraged the Egyptian national movement in
its demand for independence after World War I was
the Declaration of the Fourteen Points of US
President Woodrow Wilson issued at the end of the
war. The nationalist leader Sad Zaghlul
asked to travel to Paris at the head of an
Egyptian Delegation to attend the peace
conference there and to call for the
implementation of Wilsons ideas in Egypt.
When Britain refused, the response of the
Egyptian people was to rise in the 1919
Revolution that cannot be explained without
reference to these international developments.
In fact, all the political forces
that began to appear at the end of this period
were influenced by external factors. This does
not mean that the influence only came from the
colonial state. For example, when the Caliphate
in Turkey collapsed, the reaction in Egypt was
the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood
organization. When fascist ideas emerged in Italy
and Germany, fascistic forces took shape in Egypt
in the form of the Young Egypt (Misr
al-Fatat) party and the like. A few years after
the Communist revolution took place in Russia in
1917, the Egyptian Communist Party was formed. As
a result of the Treaty of 1936 and the
developments taking place in Egyptian society
under the semi-liberal regime, new middle class
elements in large numbers enrolled in the
military and it was they who later formed the
Free Officers Movement. And is it possible to
deny the huge effect that the 1948 War in
Palestine which in fact was entirely a
foreign product had on the subsequent
development of Egyptian politics? Indeed is it
possible to explain the success of the Free
Officers Movement without reference to British
and American interests at that particular time?
After the Second World War, the United States
inherited the British colonial mantle and became
the hegemonic power in the region, its interests
governing political developments there. US
post-War interests crystallized around three
things: protecting Israel, securing oil supplies,
and preventing Communist control over the region.
None of these goals required the
presence of democratic regimes. They required
strong regimes that were able to resist the
Communist threat and the dangers that surrounded
the petroleum resources. Accordingly, the
weakness of the old monarchic regime in Egypt and
its inability to cope with the threat coming from
such new social and political forces as the
Muslim Brotherhood or the Communists disturbed
the United States. Therefore Washington
encouraged the Free Officers to carry out their
revolution. Without this encouragement, they
would not have been able to succeed. It is very
well known that the Free Officers contacted the
US embassy in Cairo to reassure it about their
action and to neutralize the British position.
And in fact, although there were 70,000 British
troops in Egypt, they did not intervene to halt
the coup of 23 July 1952. The Americans subdued
King Faruq and US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery
asked him to submit to the Free Officers and
advised him to leave for Italy. The era of the
Egyptian monarchy came to an easy end because
Britain and the United States wanted so at that
time.
The 1952 regime thus came to
power in Egypt. The July Revolution cannot be
explained only in terms of the discontent of the
army. It is also undeniable that foreign powers
also wanted this revolution to take place. Their
assessment was precise and correct if we look at
the role that Gamal Abdel Nasser went on to play,
excluding the Communists from exercising any real
influence in the region. The Nasserist ideology
kept Arab Communists under control in a situation
that continued until the fall of the Soviet
Union. Nasserism was the only way that Arab
Communist movements could be kept in check.
In sum, the impact of the
external factor on the internal situation is one
of the political realities of the region. We are
not discussing here whether this is a good or a
bad thing; merely noting that it is a fact. If
this was the case in Egypt where there was a
government with its own political aims, what of
the role played by external factors in the
establishment of the Saudi regime and in
supporting Saudi Arabia, particularly after the
discovery of oil? And the British role in shaping
events in the Gulf and in setting the ruling
families on their thrones is too obvious to
require further proof.
Furthermore, can it be denied
that the battles between Nasser and the West had
an impact on the whole destiny of the Nasser
regime? It was those battles that led to the 1967
War and it was the defeat that had such an effect
on the internal political situation in Egypt
thereafter. Is it possible to deny that US
support for Anwar Sadat later rescued the
Egyptian regime? The US aid that began to flow
into the Egyptian treasury after the Camp David
peace agreement, which Sadat received for a year
or two, and which continued thereafter under
Mubarak, played a major role in bolstering the
Egyptian regime, particularly considering that it
amounted to more than two billion dollars a year.
The Cultural Impact
In this context it is completely
logical that cultural life in the Arab world
should be heavily influenced by external factors,
based on values and ideas, as well as the general
debate generated by sensitive political issues.
At least in the last 50 years, the basic
political orientations that were predominant in
the area cannot be separated from developments on
the world scene. The cultural influence of the
left was far greater than its political
influence. The left has played an important role
in literature, journalism, artistic production
such as the Arab cinema, a role much more
important than it has played in politics.
Naturally, this was linked to the growth of the
Communist camp and the Soviet Union. It is true
that Egyptian and Arab intellectuals who have
been greatly influenced by leftist thought have
had a major impact on the political situation as
well. The fact that democracy and the democratic
model have been linked with the American and
European models afforded a golden opportunity to
dictatorial regimes to oppose this model on the
grounds that it is a European and American
product. That was one of the factors that
impelled a populist leader like Nasser to seek
Communist support despite the fact that he had no
sympathy with Communism whatsoever. The reason is
simple: namely that the economic and political
model represented by the Communist movement and
Soviet state was different from, and indeed in
conflict with, the model that was identified in
the minds of intellectuals and the Arab elite
with European colonialism. But the
interpenetration of these factors in the end had
a negative influence, as, unfortunately, they did
not place the Arab world on the right path to
historical transition.
Can western pressure help
bring about democratic transformation?
There always were forces in Arab
society that were pressing for democracy in
confrontation with undemocratic, authoritarian
regimes. Let us go back to the Egyptian model.
The practice of Egyptian democracy before the
1952 revolution had grown so full of flaws that
it was no longer able to face down populism and
demagogy. But the failure meted out to the
Egyptian experiment in 1967 constituted an
extremely important lesson regarding the lack of
democracy, even if this lesson was brought home
to the elite and not to the people.
There is, in any case, an
important observation that needs to be made in
this regard. Every time some great disaster
befell the Arab Region, Arab intellectuals and
members of the elite bewailed the lack of
democracy. This kind of re-examination took place
after the 1948 war. The writings of Constantine
Zurayq, among many others, singled out the
absence of freedom as being one of the reasons
for the disaster. But unfortunately, as soon as
we learn, we forget, and democracy and freedom
disappeared after that once again. When the 1967
defeat occurred in Nassers time, talk once
again turned to the lack of democracy and the
absence of freedom. Another disaster followed,
not in one full swoop as in 1967, but by gradual
accumulation. Today we are suffering from a
setback no less disastrous than that of 1967, and
once again we find that the basic reason for it
is the absence of democracy.
Just as the demand for democratic
transformation has always come after disasters
and setbacks, there is now, following the two
Gulf Wars, pressure for democratization. The
truth of the matter is that from the 1950s to the
1990s, the neither United States nor Europe or
the outside world in general, supported any real
democratic aspirations in the Arab Region, since
their interests were not served by such
aspirations. Americas interest was to
preserve oil supplies and Israels security,
and fight Communism. Washington did not want
democratic regimes in the region; it wanted
strong regimes. So long as such regimes were in
place, the US had no problem. The concern of
Americans for establishing democracy among us did
not go beyond declarations and crude propaganda.
It consisted of little more than empty slogans
about the need for freedom and democracy. That
never translated into pressure for
democratization in the country. Accordingly, in
Egypt, for example, throughout the period
following 1967, the movement for democracy
remained confined to the elite. It was not a
popular movement nor, at the same time, did it
encounter any sort of support from abroad.
So, when was the turning point?
This came about for reasons that have nothing to
do with democracy. It had to do with the fall of
the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s and the
early 1990s, the subsequent rising fear in the US
of the Islamic fundamentalist danger, and the
emergence in 1993-1994 of the notion of a clash
of civilizations. September 11, 2001, transformed
it into a top priority, as the Americans realized
that the issue of democracy (or lack thereof) in
the Arab region could be the source of many of
the existing problems.
For the first time in 2001, there
was an external factor pressing for democracy.
For Egypt, it occurred after 50 years of needing
such a factor, at a time when the regime had
become corroded with age and a lengthy process of
deterioration of its institutions, and internal
pressure for reform and change was on the
increase. There is no question that the response
that came from the various Arab regimes, and the
Egyptian regime in this case, was in the first
place the result of external pressure. This in
turn raises a key question, namely what kind of
external pressure is needed? The existing regimes
are very repressive and have acquired a level of
experience in dealing with their peoples that has
turned them into experts in keeping Arab
societies in line.
The political situation might
seem difficult to read or predict. The public
agencies of the state are seriously decayed. They
are obviously failing to deliver the basic
services such as education, housing, and
healthcare at the minimum level required.
There is extensive unemployment. Yet at the same
time, there is a kind of public apathy. This
situation can be explained by resorting to
theories of revolution, the most popular of which
is that of relative deprivation, according to
which revolution takes place when there is a
state of relative deprivation, not absolute
deprivation. But the Egyptian youth today suffers
from absolute deprivation. All the statistics
indicate that a high percentage of the people
live in very extreme poverty and that they are
exhausted from the demands of daily life. There
are, for example, several million Egyptians
living under the poverty line and a similar
number suffer from chronic diseases such as
kidney failure due to the poor quality of the
water. About seven million peoples are living in
cemeteries. This all serves to demonstrate that
the predominant portion of the Egyptian people is
in a situation that renders them incapable of
taking any action. For any citizen to revolt and
oppose, he/she must first enjoy a minimum of
social amenities and the physical ability to move
and demonstrate. They cannot do this if they are
in a state of complete weakness and emaciation. A
second factor relates to the political culture of
the Egyptian people, namely, that they do not
readily get involved in a political activity. In
spite of that, those same deprived Egyptians came
out in massive demonstrations in 1967. I will
never forget when I went out with the students of
Cairo University in one of those demonstrations
in 1967, a march that reached from Cairo
University to the National Assembly. There were
about half a million of us in the street. This
happened again during the events of 18-19 January
1977 under Sadats rule. There was relative
dynamism within society, and this is one
indication of what I have been saying, since the
material conditions of the ordinary Egyptian
citizen were better then than they are now. How
can someone working 18 hours a day just to feed
his children go out and demonstrate? How can he
or she find time to exchange opinions with
friends? Thus the domestic conditions are not the
most propitious for what is called a
revolutionary explosion. So we are not facing a
revolutionary situation. There is a condition of
frustration; there is a split between the will of
the elite that is calling for change and the
apathy and indifference of the people.
In this situation, external
pressure has added value. Something that explains
and justifies the effects of such pressure is
that the ruling elite serves the outside worlds
interest and is subservient to it. It has a sense
that it derives its legitimacy from pleasing the
outside world. Therefore any instructions,
conditions or pressures from abroad have a
definite practical effect. That brings us to the
question of what the outside world can do. First
of all, it can put pressure on the arbitrary
regimes. Second, it can morally and politically
encourage a movement of resistance. Americas
enormous material and political support to Egypt
since 1974 was probably the one key factor that
kept the regime strong. If that aid were cut off
the result would be disastrous. The American
administrations have played a part in keeping the
regime in power, regardless of whether or not
they acknowledge this fact. The question then is
what kind of contribution can the United States
make? Should it be military intervention, direct
support in one form or another? I am certainly
not calling for military intervention, but rather
for support in the moral and political sense,
namely that a clear, public and consistent stance
be taken against undemocratic practices. Such a
clear stance would encourage social movements
that are demanding democracy. In other words, an
intervention does not imply a new bold
initiative. The US can merely use the influence
it already has to exert pressure.
The issue of conditional
linkage
It is well known that there is an
ongoing debate in the West concerning conditional
linkage, i.e. whether attaching conditions to aid
can have a practical effect; and if so whether
that effect will be positive or negative, and
whether the energies of the society will run out
before those of the regime.
The fact is that the complexities
of the regimes and their ability to maneuver are
much greater than is imagined. While they
themselves depend on America, they are the first
to incite against America. Surprisingly, the
rationale that guides America and Europe is not
complex. They deal with issues with a rather
simplistic approach. They do not understand the
complexity and the tricks used in the Arab world
and the East. This is the Orient! a world of
relationships and complexities that westerners
have difficulty grasping. What is going on in
Iraq is a case in point; it has thrown them into
confusion. Their expertise did not prepare them
to envision the complexities latent in Iraq but
which are present throughout the whole region.
These are what could be called cultural
factors, negative ones such as the
underhandedness and double-dealing that are a
common practice in our societies. The westerners
have taken part in it to a great extent, for it
was they who preserved and supported these
regimes. The backward, conservative situation in
the oil countries is not unrelated to the western
governments support for these orientations.
They want to control oil supply and they want the
Arab societies to remain quiet about it. They
therefore strove to limit their natural growth.
Under claims of respect for cultural specificity,
there now coexist in Saudi Arabia gigantic
buildings and modern installations together with
repressed women in veils. In other words, if we
imagine Saudi Arabia without oil, its societys
doors would have opened up and the women there
would have by now shed their veils. The problem
is that the oil revolution preserved this society
and froze it in this condition, leaving it as a
distorted society in every meaning of the word.
This is something that can hardly be separated
from the external factor. Before slipping into
the Iraqi quagmire, George Bush made a statement
at the White House in which he denounced the
beating of Egyptian women demonstrators in front
of the Journalists Association. That statement
had a great moral effect on those people who are
the most hostile to America, i.e., the leftists
and Nasserites, who were very happy about it.
The existence of
democracy restrains the Islamic forces
I acknowledge a big mistake I
used to make: I used to feel strongly that the
Americans assess and understand issues very well.
Naturally, this is not true all the time. But
more than that, sometimes they understand issues
very superficially and simplistically and make
terrible mistakes. For example, their basic
concern is over political Islam and the danger of
the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of my American
interlocutors - such as Madeleine Albright or
Richard Haass - expressed themselves in favor of
a democracy that could involve the risk that
Islamists might take power, at least for a short
period of time. But that is not the case for the
majority of American researchers and writers
whose great fear is the Islamists. Personally, I
am a liberal and I hate any form of interference
of religion in politics. But I am certain that
the problem today is not about Islamists or
non-Islamists; it is the problem of democracy or
non-democracy. The one thing that will put limits
on the Islamists is if they have to go public and
voice clearly their ideas.
One of the obvious political
realities in this region is that Islamist forces
have flourished as a direct result of dictatorial
governments and the lack of democracy. Even if
free, democratic elections bring non-democratic
forces to the fore, I am convinced that it will
only be over a short term. But most Americans do
not believe that, and this is the amazing and
saddening point in their thinking. If a genuinely
democratic regime arose in Egypt it would be
impossible for the Islamists to get more than 30
percent at most of the vote. In the last
elections of 2005 the Islamists won 88 seats in
the parliament representing 80 percent or
90 percent of their maximum potential. All those
who supported the Islamists voted in those
elections, while 70 percent of the Egyptians did
not participate in the ballot. A quick estimation
will show that 90 percent of the latter have no
connection to the Islamists. Fear of the
Islamists has produced a tendency to exaggerate
and over-estimate their influence.
Furthermore, there is nothing to
indicate that the political commitment of the
Islamists is confined to stage one of democracy,
i.e., the stage that will bring them to power!
In the last Palestinian
elections, some took the position that it was a
mistake to boycott the Islamists, while others
contended that it was a mistake to allow them
into the electoral process in the first place, if
the Oslo Agreement was to be considered as the
legitimate and preconditioned framework to which
all the political forces must be committed. In
other words, if it were a precondition, then it
would have been necessary to ban Hamas from the
elections from the start. In any case, the people
voted for Hamas out of hatred for the corruption
of Fatah. The political weakness of the
Palestinian elite was its inability to expose the
blatant double standard of Hamas for how
could they enter the elections under Israeli
supervision, under the guidance and organization
of the Israeli leadership, and in the framework
of Oslo, without recognizing Israel? The entire
discussion about the recognition or
non-recognition issue is silly anyway. It would
have been better to sidestep it and leave Hamas
to face the consequences of its position. The
statements issued by the European Union saying
that they the representatives of Hamas
entered the Legislative Council on the
basis of the working of Oslo and therefore are
bound by the agreement - were unclear to the
Palestinian population. In Egypt too, a
fundamental part of the success of the Islamists
is not because people are attracted by their
ideas so much as it is due to the corruption of
the other political forces. For example, one of
the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood was quoted
as saying that in one of the provinces of the
Delta, the Muslim Brotherhood has 400 formal
members only. But in the elections, the
Brotherhood won 40,000 votes there! The Islamists
greatest reserve of strength is the dictatorial
regime itself and the corruption of the ruling
system. When the society really opens up, the
issue will be completely transformed.
This brings us to another common
concern, namely the fear that if the Islamists
come to power they will change the constitution.
The answer to this is that the democratic system
provides the means for it to protect itself in
such a way that no one can use the system to
change the constitution. Out of place is the idea
that is being widely circulated in the West
calling for a dialogue with the Islamists in
order to secure a guarantee from them that they
will abide by democratic principles. What is
directly needed is for them to support the
democratic process as a whole. A dialogue with
the Islamists is an internal matter. At issue
today is the construction of a real democratic
system. That is the priority, and then the
democratic framework will automatically keep the
Islamists in line. If after that first step, some
national dialogue is to take place, then it
should be a dialogue involving everyone: the
Islamists, the Nasserites, the Socialists, and
the Liberals.
Training in democracy?
Some western organizations are
inclined to undertake activities aimed at
strengthening and training the political parties.
In my opinion this is very much a secondary
matter. What is needed at this stage is political
support so that the government will think one
thousand times before repressing the masses or
beating them up in the street, or before it bans
any meeting or lets some trifling little party go
on making its declarations while it refuses to
let a real, significant political party function
even when all the legal requirements have been
met and all the documents, programs, and names of
founders have been turned in as is legally
required.
In such cases, the international
organizations should be exposing what is going on
and using such arbitrary practices to demonstrate
the actual absence of democracy. All that is
needed is a guarantee of this sort; nothing more.
We are not talking about support in
the sense of any kind of military intervention,
and we do not need financial support. We need
political support so that we can feel that there
exist abroad not only in America or
Europe, but throughout the world
international organizations, human rights
organizations that are standing beside us. This
not only gives people a sense of moral support,
it makes the government think twice before it
takes any action.
Political and moral support
should be given to any party, whatever its
orientation, so long as it respects legal means
and is committed to democracy. What is important
is that the issue of democratic reform becomes
clear in peoples minds as a cause based on
principles. But American methods have been
completely different from this. Besides their
foolish position on Hamas, they are taking
disgraceful, opportunistic positions, such as the
stance they are taking on the regime of Muammar
al-Qadhafi who repressed democratic freedoms and
insulted the Libyan people. But when he became
their friend, they started dealing with him
without making any references to his tyranny and
without a glance at the Libyan opposition. What
scares the Egyptian and the Arab elites is the
rampant political opportunism of US policy. It is
obvious that the problems the US is facing in
Iraq and Afghanistan have an impact on their
approaches. There is also, I believe, a certain
inability to set priorities. For if more serious
efforts were made to support democratic reforms
in Egypt to the extent of one one-thousandth of
the American effort being made in Iraq, there
would be a positive impact on the entire Arab
region. I am referring here to moral support,
basically, and not to military intervention or
financial backing. It is surprising to observe
the inability to define and pursue goals
effectively, which is not in keeping with the
general image of expertise and competence that we
associate with the Americans. Their misfortune in
Iraq is evidence of their poor preparation and
proof that they have not understood anything. In
addition, they are entirely unclear about
priorities. For if the issue in US politics was
the spread of democracy across the Arab world,
then the most basic question that would follow
would be, where do you begin? Do you begin with
the most difficult and intractible situation? By
its nature, Iraq is a society that is difficult
to manage, as is the Iraqi nationalist identity.
The sharp divisions between the components of
that society, between the Shia, the Sunni,
and the Kurds, make Iraq the most difficult place
in which to implement democracy. In Egypt
however, it would be possible to spread democracy
with some well-studied political pressure and
persuasion. This would have had a positive impact
on the entire region. But there is not much
thought being given to this option, and nothing
to be learned from the American research centers
outputs and recommendations. Throughout its
history, Egypt has been a lighthouse for the
surrounding regions. Yet, the Americans remain
prisoners of a silly scenario that focuses on
fears of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Islamists.
Just as it is impossible to
under-estimate the importance of external support
and interactive relations with the outside world
as a basic feature of the region, it is likewise
from the other side: can the Americans do without
oil? Their interests are deeply buried in this
Arab land, and their political presence,
inevitable as it is, must be constructive and in
keeping with the hopes of its peoples.
The difference between
Europe and America
America has the power to put real
pressure on the region military, moral,
economic, etc. But if Europe and America stood
together to support the cause of political
democracy, this would have a huge impact. Is it
reasonable, for example, for the White House to
act when women are beaten in front of the
Journalists Union in Cairo, while France, the
land of freedom and democracy, remains silent, or
makes do with an official statement issued by the
spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry? This is
what I mean by moral and political support from
the governments, political parties, popular
organizations and human rights groups. They must
come to believe that spreading democracy in these
countries and backing democratic forces is a
cause that deserves their support. The material
support that they provide to some institutions of
the civil society remains a marginal issue. It
might sometimes be helpful but is not
significant.
The Americans say that they
intend to fund Arab civil society organizations
and are ready to invest the required 50 million
dollars for that purpose in the framework of the
Foundation for the Future. The Europeans might be
considering the establishment of a Foundation for
Democracy so that they can support civil society
and political parties. But we all remember the
story of the one million dollars that the US
administration wanted to distribute to Egyptian
civil society organizations after the Gulf War as
one of its first concrete actions following
George Bushs statements on democracy
promotion. It caused a tremendous commotion.
Despite the financial needs of the political
parties and other civil society organizations in
our region, which depend on contributions by
members and supporters, most of whom are poor,
these organizations and parties cannot sacrifice
their reputations for financial support, even
though they might be in desperate need of it. In
any case, democracy is not built on money and
financial support remains a secondary matter.
What builds democracy is the political support
that can curb the state. Egypt is in a bad
situation right now and the fact that things have
deteriorated so far is neither in the interest of
the Americans nor of the Europeans. More serious
commitment to support democratic development
through political and moral means is what is
really needed.
It is often said that the
priorities of the West have once again become
dependent on stability and security, hence on
supporting governments that ensure both, in
particular strong governments, and that the Wests
interest in democracy has diminished. Such
behavior will end up harming western strategic
interests over the long run. The democratic
forces in the region that are going to face
greater difficulties and increasing suffering
will not develop any sense of gratitude or love
for the West and will never feel that they share
its values. That means that their basic interests
will be affected and that the feelings of
hostility vis-à-vis the West and the outside
world will grow stronger. If this hostility
becomes predominant under democratic regimes with
strong civil society movements, the situation
will be much more dangerous than the hostility
that we see today. Any rational assessment should
impel the West to support the democratic movement
in the Arab and Islamic World.
Westerners must understand that
at this stage they are dealing with peaceful
opposition movements. But should these movements
be repressed once again, there is nothing to
guarantee that the next wave of opposition will
remain actually committed to that peaceful path.
A new radicalism will enter the field and the
collision is likely to be much more violent. So
now is the best time to act. This situation is
not limited to Egypt; it is true of Syria, Iraq,
Lebanon, Tunisia, the Sudan and others. This is
the general climate. As far as I know the region,
if a real democratic awakening takes place in
Egypt, it will spill over to other Arab countries
and the region as a whole. Therefore I emphasize
the importance of supporting democratic
transformation in Egypt. Continuing to support
the regimes, taking a hesitant, politically
opportunist approach defined by narrow interests
will convince the peoples in the region that the
West is not serious about democracy.
Egypt is ready. It can undergo a
complete democratic transformation within two
years. The Egyptian personality is not inclined
to violence and is always ready to compromise. It
readily accepts adjustment to new ideas. The
Egyptians have a democratic tradition to be
reckoned with and practice is what establishes
this. If that were not so, how would it be that
the Indians have a democratic culture? I saw
people there living in miserable poverty but they
know what the vote is and they respect it. In the
last legislative elections in Egypt, the people
in the remotest rural areas were determined to
vote. The situation is not as dead as it might
seem, on the contrary the people desire to
accomplish something.
The speed of democratic
transition and the role of the media
The current understanding of
democracy differs from what it was 40 years ago.
Globalization, satellite dishes, and the
satellite networks have brought to the people an
excellent understanding of these issues and this
can be most helpful.
The Egyptian poor have some
unique characteristics. An Egyptian might not buy
a bed or a chair, and he certainly hasnt
bought any refrigerator or cooker. He still cooks
with kerosene. But he must buy a television. The
Egyptians have a flaming interest in the media.
They are one of the Arab peoples who most highly
values culture and information. There is a very
strange phenomenon that one can see in the rural
areas, one that yields wealth today, and that is
that anybody who has a little money will buy a
reception dish and the appliances for receiving
satellite TV. The peasant pays two or three
Egyptian pounds every month to be connected by
cable. As there is no control on property rights
in Egypt, anyone can be connected. This is having
a tremendous impact and is one example of very
simple and relatively cheap instruments of
change.
I would also present the case of
the US sponsored al-Hurrah TV station as an
example. In the beginning, the station was the
object of harsh attacks, but with time, it has
become popular and influential. The provocative
parliamentarian Talaat al-Sadat gave an interview
to the al-Hurrah station that aroused peoples
interest and considerable debate. As the free
media advance, democratic transformation becomes
easier. For three or four years, the British have
been thinking about setting up an Arabic BBC. Why
have they delayed? And why arent the French
doing the same thing? Free media have constituted
the most important and most influential factor in
Egyptian political culture in recent years
because it has become difficult for the
government to control the media. Today there are
new channels: Dream, al-Mihwar, Orbit, and
al-Hurrah, in addition to al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyah.
Let me just give a personal illustration of this
with two programs. When I raised my objections to
the amendment of article 76 of the Constitution
in 2005 and tendered my resignation, all of Egypt
knew me from one program on Dream and a 10-minute
interview. The medium of television equals a
hundred political speeches and a thousand
articles.
At the beginning, people had
doubts about al-Hurrah and boycotted it because
of its close connections with the Americans. But
they themselves started to watch it because it
brought something new. The same goes for the
Lebanese channel LBC. So when a strong British
station is set up in the Arabic language, and a
French and German one in addition to al-Hurrah,
the effect of that will go far beyond governments
and will influence popular culture. These are
costly projects in terms of investment criteria,
though in terms of the strategic goals of any
state, cost is not a consideration. Al-Jazeera -
which was originally a project of the BBC, which
the BBC then abandoned - has won a huge audience.
Sometimes a crude Arab nationalist or Islamic
orientation becomes dominant there, but it
provides news services that are first rate.
The question is how can we help
the people to listen and watch and understand?
How can we open the doors so that they can
breathe clean air? Not by money or military
intervention, or anything like that. When the
people begin to think correctly, then matters
will take the correct course.