THE HANDSTAND

MAY 2004

    



This cartoon depicts one assailant and this short report from the village of Biddu depicts another:Gila Svirsky,Jerusalem," I just spoke to Molly Malekar on her way to Sha'arei Tzedek Hospital in Jerusalem, Molly is the director of Bat Shalom, which is the women's peace organization that forms the Israeli side of The Jerusalem Link: A Women's Joint Venture for Peace (the Palestinian side is called the Jerusalem Center for Women). and here is what she reported:

"We were about 60 women, only women:  roughly 1/3 Israeli, 1/3 Palestinian, and 1/3 internationals.  We gathered at Bidu to protest the construction of the wall in this village.  It was a quiet march, with women carrying signs and walking toward the area where soldiers were guarding the construction of the fence.  At a distance of about 10 meters (30 feet) from them, we stopped walking because the soldiers turned to point their rifles directly at us.  I called out to them in Hebrew, "Don't shoot, we're not armed, this is a nonviolent demonstration."  Suddenly there was an onslaught of teargas and stun grenades, falling all around us, completely out of proportion to the quiet, nonprovocative nature of our action.  The grenades fell right there at our feet and we were choking, unable to breathe.  Most dispersed and ran back.  Soldiers charged toward us and fell upon the women, grabbing some whom they arrested.  By then, there was no demonstration at all, nothing to disperse.  Most of the women had run back, trying to recover from the tear gas, but I remained as I wanted to talk to the soldiers to prevent the
arrest of the four women.  Suddenly out of nowhere four horses charged, with border police mounted on them.  I started to run away, but one of them ridden by a girl soldier caught up with me and she struck me on my head with a baton.  I fell, and then a second horse charged toward me and I felt more blows on my head and back.  There was no provocation whatsoever at any point while this was happening."I asked her by cell phone, on her way to the hospital, how she feels and she said, "A horrible headache, my ears hurt, and aching from the blows.  But let's think about how to wake people up to what is happening out there.  We have to wake people up."


Conflict Resolution:
I regret that this paper is without notes that have not been provided at source(Mediate.com) It is followed by a review of a valuable book on the Arab World by Halim Barakat.JB,Editor.



.CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD-
by Professor George E. Irani

http://www.mediate.com/articles/mideast.cfm

Many Middle Eastern scholars and practitioners trained in the United States have returned to their countries of origin ready to impart what they learned about Western conflict resolution techniques. In Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and other countries in the region, the teaching and practice of conflict resolution is still a novel phenomenon. Conflict resolution is viewed by many as a false Western panacea, a program imposed from outside and thus insensitive to indigenous problems, needs, and political processes.

Indeed, many people in the Middle East view conflict resolution as a scheme concocted by the United States meant primarily to facilitate and hasten the processes of peace and "normalization" between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In assessing the applicability of Western-based conflict resolution models in non-Western societies, theoreticians and practitioners alike have begun to realize the importance of being sensitive to indigenous ways of thinking and feeling, as well as to local rituals for managing and reducing conflicts.

Middle East peacemaking has been a rather superficial phenomenon in the sense that diplomatic agreements have not "trickled down" to the grassroots. Peace treaties based solely on economic and political enticements, coercion or purely strategic considerations cannot last if they are not accompanied by a sincere, profound exploration of the underlying, emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow, and mistrust resulting from decades of warfare and unending cycles of victimization and vengeance. In order to bring peace to the Middle East, policymakers must foster and encourage a dialogue that takes into consideration indigenous rituals and processes of reconciliation.

The purpose of this essay is to explore and analyze non-Western modes and rituals of conflict reduction in Arab-Islamic societies. The necessity for such a study also stems from the dearth of available works relating conflict management and resolution processes to indigenous rituals of reconciliation. There is a need to fathom the deep cultural, social, and religious roots that underlie the way Arabs behave when it comes to conflict reduction and reconciliation.

Thus, this article discusses the socio-economic, cultural, and anthropological background in which conflicts erupt and are managed in the Middle East. Issues such as the importance of patrilineal families; the question of ethnicity; the relevance of identity; the nature of tribal and clan solidarity; the key role of patron-client relationships; and the salience of norms concerning honor and shame need to be explored in their geographical and socio-cultural context.

Religious beliefs and traditions are also relevant to conflict control and reduction, including the relevant resources in Islamic law and tradition Different causes and types of conflicts (family, community, and state conflicts) need to be considered, as do indigenous techniques and procedures, such as wasta (patronage-mediation) and tahkeem (arbitration). The rituals of sulh (settlement) and musalaha (reconciliation) are examples of Arab-Islamic culture and values and should be looked at for insight into how to approach conflict resolution in the Middle East. Finally, there is the need to consider the implications of these issues and insights for practitioners and policymakers. To what extent is an integration of Western and non-Western models of conflict reduction and reconciliation possible?

This paper looks first at Western and non-Western approaches to conflict "resolution" and points to important cultural differences in approaching conflict management, including the role of the individual in society; attitudes towards conflict; styles of communication; expectations of mediators, understandings concerning "victimization" and "forgiveness," and the usefulness of governmental (and/or non-governmental) programs and institutions--such as truth commissions--for "national reconciliation."

The second section considers the geographical, sociological, and cultural influences on the Arab Middle East. It highlights the importance of relation ships based on family, patriarchy and gender, kinship, and clientism, and points to the continuing underlying code of honor (and its counterpart, shame) in conflict and conflict management.

The third part considers the concept of ritual and its role in conflict "control and reduction" (as opposed to conflict "resolution") and focuses on the rituals of sulh and musalaha as examples of indigenous Arab modes of settling disputes. The final section considers the implications for policymakers and practitioners and suggests an alternative approach to national reconciliation in Lebanon.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN APPROACHES

Although conflict is a human universal, the nature of conflicts and the methods of resolving conflict differ from one socio-cultural context to another. For instance, in contemporary North American contexts, conflict is commonly perceived to occur between two or more individuals acting as individuals, i.e., as free agents pursuing their own interests in various domains of life. Conflict is often perceived as a symptom of the need for change. While conflict can lead to separation, hostility, civil strife, terrorism and war, it can also stimulate dialogue, fairer and more socially just solutions. It can lead to stronger relationships and peace.

The basic assumption made by Western conflict resolution theorists is that conflict can and should be fully resolved. This philosophy, whereby virtually every conflict can be managed or resolved, clashes with other cultural approaches to conflict. Many conflicts, regardless of their nature, may be intractable, and can evolve through phases of escalation and confrontation as well as phases of calm and a return to the status quo ante. This is why this essay adopts the idea of conflict control and reduction to depict the processes of settlement and reconciliation in the Arab-Islamic tradition.

The third basic assumption in U.S.-based conflict resolution is that conflict usually erupts because of different interpretations regarding data, issues, values, interests and relationships. According to the prominent anthropologist Laura Nader: "Conflict results from competition between at least two parties. A party may be a person, a family, a lineage, or a whole community; or it may be a class of ideas, a political organization, a tribe, or a religion. Conflict is occasioned by incompatible desires or aims and by its duration may be distinguished from strife or angry disputes arising from momentary aggravations."

Conflict in Western perspectives is also viewed as having a positive dimension, acting as a catharsis to redefine relationships between individuals, groups, and nations and makes it easier to find adequate settlements or possible resolutions. During the last ten years, more and more voices within the field of conflict resolution have been calling attention to the importance of acknowledgment and forgiveness in achieving lasting reconciliation among conflicting parties. Many of the world's most intractable conflicts involve age-old cycles of oppression, victimization and revenge. These conflicts, which can have dangerous and long-lasting political repercussions, are rooted in a psychological dynamic of victimization. Racism and "ethnic cleansing" are only the most dramatic manifestations of such cycles of victimization and vengeance.

One of the guiding principles of U.S.-inspired conflict management and resolution is to help individuals or groups embroiled in conflict to acknowledge one another's psychological concerns and needs so that they will be able to overcome their historic sense of victimization. Victimization is a crucial concept to grasp when dealing with protracted conflicts, whether personal or political. Overcoming feelings of victimization, which, unfortunately, are endemic to the human condition, is the most important step towards healing. Usually, acts of violence (whether inflicted on an individual or a group), are the results of deep feelings of being victimized, regardless of who is the victim or victimizer.

In the case of nations and ethnic groups embroiled in conflict, acknowledgment of unhealed wounds from pain inflicted in the past facilitates the resolution of conflicts. From a Western psychological perspective, conflict usually erupts because some basic needs have not been fulfilled, such as needs for shelter, food, self-esteem, love, knowledge, and self-actualization. The non-fulfillment of these needs, exacerbated by acute feelings of victimization, inevitably leads to conflict and may eventually lead to war. A first step in the process of healing, then, is the mutual acknowledgment by all parties of their emotions, viewpoints and needs. Thus, the first and most crucial skill which conflicting parties must develop is that of actively listening to each other.

Communication skills are fundamental to conflict resolution. In many cultures, the art of listening is drowned out by arguments and the never-ending struggle to get one's point across first. The opposite of listening is not ignoring; rather, it is preparing to respond. Mediators are trained to listen carefully to all parties involved in a dispute. Active listening is a method that ensures that the whole meaning of what was said is understood.

Mediation is another skill used by Western practitioners in conflict resolution. The mediator confronts two basic tasks when involved in settling a dispute. First, he or she has to encourage people to negotiate in such a way that there is an equitable outcome. Second, the mediator has to be completely neutral and place the expertise and power of decision-making in the hands of the conflicting individuals or groups themselves. In addition to mediation in conflict resolution, negotiation is another important tool in Western conflict resolution processes. "Interest-based" negotiation focuses on people's long-term interests, rather than on short-term perspectives, and does not encourage hard or soft types of bargaining (this is the case when one of the parties has to give in or compromise) which usually lead to unsatisfactory "positional" compromises.

Following the collapse of various dictatorial regimes in Latin America and Central Europe (e.g., Chile, Argentina, Brazil, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland), truth and justice commissions
were formed to "police the past", i.e., to investigate the extent of human rights violations committed against civilians by the former military juntas and Communist parties in these countries. These efforts encouraged a healing process of atonement and remorse for past crimes which, in turn, helped citizens and governments alike to rebuild democratic institutions A similar process recently began in South Africa following the dismantling of the apartheid regime and the election of Nelson Mandela as President of the new Republic of South Africa.

Lebanon shares some of the problems affecting societies in transition, though the country has not fully regained control of its sovereignty. In April 1994, as a contribution to the ongoing efforts at intercommunal reconciliation in post-war Lebanon, the Lebanese American University assembled on its Byblos campus a group of government officials, NGO activists, students, and lawyers, for a three-day conference entitled "Acknowledgment, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation: Alternative Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Post- War Lebanon." The conference focused primarily on the psychological and interpersonal aspects of the Lebanese War, especially the politics of identity and the vicious circle of victimization and vengeance that fueled the long conflict.

Walid Jumblat Head of the Lebanese Druze spoke in April:
Bush also rejected a return of Palestinian refugees to what is now Israel, leaving roughly 360,000 refugees in Lebanon with even less cause for hope.

Lebanon bars them from most jobs and owning land. Jumblatt called on his country to ease their miserable conditions. "We have to give them the minimum of guarantees so they can work in Lebanon because I think between now and their going back to Palestine it may be another 50 years," he said.

Lebanon says it defends the right of Palestinian refugees to return to homes they fled at Israel's creation in 1948.


Conference participants were initially uncomfortable with and suspicious of the theory and techniques of Western conflict resolution. Mixed feelings were expressed about the applicability of conflict resolution in the Lebanese social context. A Christian banker who was educated in the United States noted that conflict resolution theory was initially forged in labor management relations in the United States and that later it was applied to business and then to community relations and academia. He raised an important methodological question: "How can a theory which is supposed to be dealing with definite, programmed, institutionalized relationships deal with the unprogrammed, informal, and random relationships characteristic of social and political contexts in a totally different society?" A Muslim academic and social activist declared that a better concept would be "conflict management", because "it is impossible completely to solve conflicts; the existence of conflicts goes together with human existence." He raised the related point that conflicts were interrelated, the resolution of one conflict was contingent upon the resolution of other conflicts. "The crisis of Lebanon and the Middle East are the best proof of what I am saying," he concluded.

The conference also revealed interesting insights into Lebanese conversational culture. The National Director of the Young Women's Christian Association-Lebanon (YWCA) commented that in Lebanon, when individuals are engaged in "heart-to-heart" conversations, they often interrupt with expressions of empathy and support. "It is not like interrupting rudely. The process of the discussion shows our concern because we are a very emotional people. That is the problem: we usually talk all together. We are active talkers and active listeners!"

A further area of difficulty came to light when participants discussed the necessity, in active listening, of remaining silent when the other person is talking, especially in cases of intense argumentation. In Lebanon, remaining silent is sometimes interpreted as meek acquiescence or agreement. A government representative from the Ministry of Education stated that "in the rural areas of Lebanon, if you do not talk, it means you are dull; the more you talk, the more it is assumed you know. People want to show that they know, especially those who go to town and come back to the village. They always talk." The key role of third parties or mediators in disputes was also addressed. In Lebanese culture, as in Arab culture in general, the mediator is perceived as someone having all the answers and solutions. He therefore has a great deal of power and responsibility. As one participant put it: "If [the third party] does not provide the answers, he or she is not really respected or considered to be legitimate." Finally, a number of conference participants expressed their expectations that conference organizers and facilitators would provide ready-made solutions to Lebanon's woes. This expectation was not unusual in the context of Lebanese culture and politics.

For several centuries, politics in Lebanon have been repeatedly penetrated by outside powers, either to foment strife or to impose solutions. The phenomenon of relying on outsiders for answers and solutions reveal some of the fundamental blind spots in Lebanese political thought: a lack of responsibility for one's actions and behaviors. At a more practical level, many Lebanese have opted to forget about the war and get on with their lives, even if the wounds and consequences of the war are still very much alive in the collective and individual Lebanese psyches.

Denial seems to be the defense mechanism of choice for many traumatized Lebanese in the wake of the long and damaging war. This behavior is not unique to the Lebanese situation. Victimization is a crucial concept to grasp when dealing with protracted conflicts, whether personal or political. Overcoming feelings of victimization (which, unfortunately, may be said to be endemic to the human
condition), is the most important step towards healing.

Participants reacted to this new approach by exploring the sources of Lebanon's conflict through the psychological scars of victimization. A Lebanese woman educator, while acknowledging the value of this approach,pointed out that these conflict resolution tools in the Lebanese context are hindered by the paradox that Lebanon is a "very individualistic society, but unfortunately, we do not have individuals." She went on to explain that "in order to have conflict management or conflict resolution, you have to recognize the other. But, you do not have the other if you do not have the individual. That is why there is no reconciliation, forgiveness, and conflict resolution [in Lebanon]. The existence of the individual is essential in this process."

This trenchant observation neatly summarizes the state of society in post-war Lebanon. Rather than a cohesive group of individuals bound together by a n agreed-upon set of rights and obligations, (i.e., citizens), the Lebanese instead comprise an agglomeration of competing communities, each of which requires absolute allegiance and obedience from its members. Every one of these communities feels that the others have victimized it, so the process of acknowledgment, forgiveness, and reconciliation has to begin at the community level, rather than at the individual level.

These new and challenging concepts of conflict resolution--acknowledgment, victimization, communication skills, interest-based negotiation--elicited many reactions from conference participants. The most poignant reaction came from a Lebanese woman whose husband was "disappeared" during the war and who founded the Committee of Families of Kidnapped People. Commenting on victimization and how to overcome it in negotiations, she used two examples to emphasize her point: "The first example concerns the Israeli occupation of my country. If my country began negotiations with Israel, it means that there is an intention to solve the conflict. But I do not understand why Israel is insisting on keeping me a victim because after each negotiation session, there are more dead people in the villages of South Lebanon. I cannot understand how I will emerge from a sense of victimization if I am negotiating and paying in victims every day. It is no longer a matter of common interests, but of recognition of rights. Someone is refusing to recognize these rights to the party we are calling the victim."

The second example she gave was personal and related to the issue of the 17,000 kidnapped Lebanese whose fates are still unknown. "The kidnapped person is a victim and so are his family members. These people have to stop being victims and maybe they even have to fight not to be victimized. But when the obstacles are still there and the kidnapper does not acknowledge any of my rights, what will my position be as a victim? How can we reach a solution if I have a right and he has an interest?"

Finally, many Lebanese participants at the conference raised the issue of government accountability for crimes committed during the Lebanese War. In t he case of Lebanon, the state's apparatus was
noticeably absent during the long civil war. Thus, the central government and its institutions bear little, if any, direct responsibility for the atrocities committed between 1975 and 1990. Instituting war tribunals or truth and justice commissions in post-war Lebanon without some form of external, third-party intervention would undoubtedly be perceived as an affront by one community against another.

THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST: THE SETTING

Geography has an impact on the ways people interact and behave for the protection of their honor and their scarce resources. The Arab Middle East is distinguished geographically by a variety of landscapes. The Arabian Peninsula is characterized by a large desert and other arid landscapes, and a scarcity of water.

In the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan), environmental conditions are more clement. Jordan and some areas of Palestine are semi-arid and poor in water while Lebanon and Syria are blessed with milder climates and numerous springs and rivers. Lebanon, has a rugged mountainous terrain but also a fertile valley (the Bekaa Valley) and self-sufficiency in water.

Ecological realities in the Middle East have given rise to three key modes of subsistence: nomadic, village, and urban. Although communities of pastoral nomads, village farmers, and city-dwelling merchants and artisans were historically distinct from one another, they were nonetheless economically interdependent. Their lives and interests were always in actual or potential contact, and quite often in conflict. Although pastoral nomadism has become increasingly rare as a viable mode of subsistence, due to the advent of nation-states with closed borders and the rapid, dramatic urbanization and of the region's population, nomadic peoples and their traditions have nonetheless left a very deep imprint on Middle Eastern culture, society, and politics. One anthropologist hypothesizes that the characteristic form of pastoral nomadism that developed in this semi-arid zone accounts for the strikingly similar cultural orientations found throughout the vast area of the Middle East:

"In the Near East today we find a remarkable similarity among the traditions of many peoples throughout a large region....Islamization, the spread of a religious faith, is often offered as an explanation for this uniformity. But could Islam by itself have become so deeply-rooted among the diverse peoples of such a vast area, unless it was somehow a response to a life experience which all of these people shared in common?...Extreme arid conditions resulted in independent little herding groups dispersed across the desert and steppe....This situation is reflected in the atomistic form which political alliances tended to take."

Sociologically, the peoples of the Middle East remain famous for their loyal attachment to their families, distinctive rituals of hospitality and conflict mediation, and effective and flexible kin-based collectivities, such as the lineage and the tribe, which until quite recently performed most of the social, economic, and political functions of communities in the absence of centralized state governments.

Family in the Middle East is dominated by the powerful role patriarchy plays in decision-making. The father's authority in his family is an integral part of the more general authority system. Patriarchal authority maintains not only the genealogical cohesiveness of the family but also the cohesiveness of social life. This patriarchal pattern of power is made concrete and takes shape in the primacy of the zaim (leader) of the family. The zaim controls and defends the cohesiveness of the family inside the group as well as in the relationships between the family and other families. The zaim acts as the family referee and sanctions conflicts that erupt within his family, while controlling the solidarity and support within and between family members. He acts as the family's ambassador towards outsiders. Given that every village is made up of many families, each family is headed by a zaim. The heads of each family form the assembly of the village zuama'.

A related element in understanding social and political behavior in the Middle East is kinship systems. Despite the creation of modern states following the collapse of colonial rule, the basic unit of identification for the individual is not the state, the ethnic group, or the professional association, but the family.

Several writers on the Arab Middle East have underlined the fact that the only nation-state in the contemporary Arab Middle East is Egypt. Egypt has a homogeneous population that identifies itself first and foremost as Egyptian. The only sizeable "minority", the Copts, who number around 6 million members, consider themselves as the descendants of the original population of Egypt from pharaonic times. Their allegiance is to Egypt as both government and country.

In Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, it is a family--the House of Saud--that dominates the body politic. The same applies to the various sheikdoms of the Arabian Gulf. In other countries of the Levant, namely Syria and Iraq, families from minority communities rule their respective societies. Since Lebanon obtained independence in 1943, it has been ruled by a few prominent families--both Christian and Muslim--such as the Maronite Catholic Gemayel and Chamoun families, the Sunni Es-Solh and Salam families, and the Druze Jumblatt family.

As a strategy for survival, the patrilineal kinship system of the Middle East has certainly proved flexible and effective over many centuries under a variety of social, economic, and political conditions. The distinctive kinship systems and practices of the Middle East are part of the region's civilizational heritage. Kinship is implicated in nearly every aspect of life and most social institutions, including religion and morality.

Michael Meeker, a prominent anthropologist, speculates that the cultural uniformity which we now find in the arid zone does not reflect the traditions of a people bent on violence. "On the contrary, it reflects...a moral response to the threat of political turmoil. The process of Islamization itself can be viewed in part as a moral reaction to the problems that arose from the circumstances of Near Eastern pastoral nomadism....All over the arid zone, popular traditions can be described in terms of three cultural themes:
1) agonistic rhetoric of political association;
2) humanistic religious values which center on conceptions of exemplary personal behavior;
3) social norms of personal integrity and familial propriety which often take the form of concepts of honor."

Religion also plays a very important role in affecting the individual's life in both private and public interactions. Birthplace of the three monotheistic faiths--Judaism, Christianity and Islam--the Middle East is a part of the world where religion plays a crucial symbiotic role in the individual's and community's life. The socio-cultural and historic environment that saw the birth and spread of these three religions encouraged a close relationship between the private and public in the individual's life in the Middle East.

In Judaism, the land (eretz), the people (ha'am), and the book (torah) cannot be separated. The same applies to Islam, which is a code of conduct, both temporal and spiritual. The Qur'an dictates
the faithful's relations with God and people of other faith living within the framework of the Islamic .umma (nation). Christianity in the Arab world is also very similar to Judaism and Islam. For example, for some Christians in Lebanon religious values are superseded by the fight for survival. Religion is used in an ethnic sense.

Middle Eastern societies are defined by a variety of ethnic identities. Armenians, Kurds, Jews, Copts, Circassians, Maronites, these are but some of t he minorities that dwell in the contemporary
Middle East. The existence of ethnic and ethno-religious groups pre- dates the rise of Islam and the creation of modern states in the Middle East. In the Qur'an, "Peoples of the Book" (Christians and
Jews) are treated as "protected peoples," dhimmis, which literally means those on the conscience (dhimma) of the Islamic community. In order to be protected, non-Muslims had to pay a tax, jizya.

Under Ottoman rule, individuals living in the empire did not identify as Ottomans, Turks, Persians, or Arabs, but rather, as Muslims, Christians, Jews , and Druze. The Ottoman administration was controlled in its majority by Sunni Muslims and converts from other religions. In the Ottoman Empire, Islamic tolerance of Christians and Jews was defined by the millet (nations) system. Under the system local communities of a particular sect were autonomous in the conduct of their spiritual affairs and civil affairs relating closely to religion and community, such as church administration, marriage, inheritance, property, and education.

Ethnic groups thus identified with their religious leaders more so than with any abstract notion of the state. The millet system estranged Arab Christians from political life and deepened suspicions between them and Muslims. Christians were treated as foreigners and suspected of being agents of foreign powers; their loyalty was often in doubt. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and in reaction to their plight, Middle Eastern Christians were at the forefront of the new movement for Arab nationalism, the secular movement in the Arab world, and some among them founded socialist parties, such as the Baath (renaissance) Party now in power in Syria and Iraq.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the pervasive impact of economic globalization have had a negative impact on individuals in the Middle East. Lacking strong and legitimate governments, they
have turned to their nuclear and extended families for support and mutual assistance. In addition to reactivating kinship networks, religious and ethnic affiliations, and patronage relationships, Middle Easterners have also embraced the latest inventions of modern technology such as compact discs, satellite dishes, and the World Wide Web.

A perceptive observer of Arab society, Halim Barakat, writes that "the contemporary Arab economic order is a peculiar cluster of different modes of production, all operating at once, which renders it simultaneously semi-feudal, semi-socialist, and semi-capitalist." This schizophrenic nature of Middle Eastern society is also illustrated by the coexistence of religious fundamentalists and secular intellectuals, and agrarian forms of production .

 
Biography
George E. Irani is Visiting Assistant Professor in Political Science at Washington College. Between 1993 and 1997, he was a faculty member in Political Science at the Lebanese American University (formerly Beirut University College, where he taught courses on conflict resolution, and was one of the founders of the Lebanese Conflict Resolution Network (LCRN). In 1997-1998, he was a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. This paper is based on the research he conducted at USIP on rituals of reconciliation in the Arab-Islamic traditions.



It might be as well to keep in mind the following paragraph written by Gilad Atzmon among his papers:
In the light of Sharon's bloody history, we must try to understand his most recent role. Clearly, he is using every possible method to render Arafat and the Palestinian authority as total outcasts so that the only alternative for the Palestinian authority is a form of radical Islamic government. Arafat's absence will turn the Palestinian dream of a civilized multicultural state into a religious Islamic affair. By continually humiliating the Palestinian people, Sharon is leading them all toward complete despair that leads to suicidal activities. Sharon and his government are turning Palestine into a religious and tribal regime. Through despair and frustration, he is pushing young Palestinians into desperate action. His tactics is very simple. First he will turn the Palestinians into Taliban look-alikes and then he will flatten them in much the same way as his mentor George W. Bush has done. Sharon's tactics always looks brilliant on paper and within government cabinet meetings. In real life something always goes wrong. The Palestinians never managed to take over Jordan. In fact, they lost any power they once had in Jordanian politics. The Christian phalanges did not hold on to power in Lebanon. Instead, Lebanon turned into a slaughterhouse for Israeli soldiers. Eventually, following relatively heavy loses, the Israelis were forced to withdraw from Lebanon, presenting the Arab world with a new form of Jewish weakness and vulnerability.................Within the Zionist framework, Sharon's tactics is completely logical.
He provides Jews and Palestinians with an unresolved conflict. He is right to do so because there is no resolution to the conflict as long as Israel maintains its Zionist, nationalistic and racial ideals. Zionism is based on conflict and the denial of the rights of the Other. Under Sharon's supervision, the Israeli media protects Israelis from learning about the atrocities that are committed by the Israeli army against Palestinian civilians. Therefore, the Israeli public regards any attack on it as evidence of Palestinian barbarity and inhumanity. Israeli propaganda denies the Israelis any real understanding of the actual chain of events.(The Devil Sings Again)


.BOOK REVIEW OF : The Arab World,By Halim Barakat.
Review by Reem Regina Tatar©2000

In Halim Barakat's book, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, Barakat provides a scholarly and informative analysis of the Arab world. Barakat examines Arab society and culture by explaining and defining its diversity. He uses examples of various Arab countries and patterns of living, as well as political and social thought to illustrate the rich culture and history of the Arab world. Barakat also examines the major issues of Arab identity, social structures, politics, and religion. These elements culminate in an enlightening, interesting, and thorough presentation of Arab society.

In analyzing Arab identity, Barakat states the most fundamental element that brings Arabs together is the Arabic language. The nahdha, or renaissance, represents what many Arabs hope to achieve in their society: political and social integration. Barakat argues that although the Arabs have not been successful in doing this so far, he still believes there is hope. Barakat leans toward secular society as being more beneficial to the Arabs. However, he acknowledges that there are various religions within the Arab world that play a tremendous role in the lives of Moslems, Maronites, Druze, and Alawites, to name a few. Another important theme describing Arab identity is group relations and how Arabs relate to one another. Barakat states that it is very important for Arabs to identify with eachother in groups. Also, the society is a patriarchal one, which means the father has authority in the family and men dominate the power in society.

Barakat classifies Arab society as homogenous, pluralistic, and mosaic. An example of a homogenous society, one that is mainly the same throughout, is found in Egypt and Tunisia. The main population in these countries is Moslem. The pluralistic society, which has one main community taking precedence over a few smaller ones, can be found in Syria. Seventy percent of Syria is Sunni, while the Alawi, Christians, and others have a much less percentage. The mosaic society, which has no majority and contains strong communal cleavages, is in Lebanon. Lebanon contains Maronite Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Moslems, Druze, and others. Barakat describes attributes of Bedouin, rural, and urban societies in the Arab world. He also examines the various classes within urban society: traditional bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, and the impoverished masses. Ultimately, one common bond that Arabs share, regardless of religion or nationality, is that they all have experienced national disasters, faced rejection from the west, and experienced unsteady relations with Israel, which has been a relentless political conflict.

I will now discuss the Arab family and Arab politics. I will examine family first because the family is the "basic unit of socio-economic strength" in society and has seniority over all economic, social, and political matters of society. Barakat goes into great lengths about the strong Arab family bond, and the various elements of it: the actions of the children affect the family's image for good or for bad, and the mother is often in self-denial, putting her family's needs before her own. It is undeniable that the family is the center of Arab society. However, Arab society as a whole has suffered because of the family's devotion to one another instead of putting the needs of the state first.

This now brings us to Arab politics and movements. Barakat describes three major movements, which have attempted to put the state first and reform the Arab world. The nationalist movements are local, regional, and pan-Arab. Influential revolutionaries involved are the pan-Arabists, the Ba'th party. Nasser of Egypt played a tremendous role in "umma:" bringing the Arabs together as one nation. However, Barakat argues that the nationalists failed in their attempt because they contributed much time toward the conflict with Israel and not enough devotion to the support of the Arab people. Also, they abused the power that their positions as rulers brought them, which contributed to their decline. Aside from the regimes mentioned above, there is also the radical Moslem Brotherhood. This group does not approach the unification of society in the way that pan-Arabists or other nationalists do. Many conflicts have arisen due to the fact that there are various political approaches, each with their own viewpoints on how to unify Arab society.

Barakat explores value orientation: the symbols, ethics, norms, concepts, beliefs, and difference in values that characterize the Arab world. He states that social class and where a person lives has much to do with Arab value differences. Barakat gives many examples of how orientalists and westerners have tried to characterize and generalize Arab values. He uses the examples of an orientalist named Patei, in order to debunk the myths that orientalists have created. Barakat examines the values of fatalism versus free will, shame versus guilt, and conformity versus creativity, among many others, to show that Arabs are not fatalism-shame-conformity oriented but that their society contains all elements of the dual values mentioned above.

For example, Arabs should not be characterized as only believing in "fate" (meaning that they believe in a predestined life course formulated by the divine rather than the ability to choose their own path and life actions.) Arabs are capable of making their own life decisions and determining their own actions. Arabs have also been stereotyped as being heart-spirit-faith oriented people. Barakat suggests that westerners should not characterize the Arab world as a culture of the heart, which lacks reason and logic. While it is true that many Arabs are emotional and religious, it is not fair to disregard their logical and rational minds. Barakat also discusses Arab creative and literary pursuits. Literature often reflects the social issues of the Arabs. Barakat mentions writers such as Naguib Mahfouz who portrays Egyptian society "more comprehensively and accurately than the works of all the social scientists put together."

The final topic I will discuss in Barakat's book is religion in Arab society, primarily Islam. Barakat uses a sociological approach in studying the elements of religion: its social origins, religion and sect, official and popular religion, and its functions. He uses the viewpoints of various philosophers, psychologists, and others, including Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud to examine religion and its purpose. Ultimately, Barakat concludes from their examinations that religion is an "expression in one form or another of a sense of dependence on a power outside ourselves." Barakat comments on the function of the sect, which is a social organization of people in a community that are affiliated with each other. He says that sects have more power in the eastern Arab world than religion does. Some examples of sects are the Druze, Sunni, and Catholic Christian communities.

Barakat asserts that religion does not play a strong role of "spiritual, moral, or integrative force" to Arabs anymore. Religion has not been used by traditional governments for its spiritual nature, but has been more of a political tool for controlling the people. He states that rulers in the Arab world have often used religion to control the masses and to prevent people from rebelling. Also, an interesting point that Barakat adds is that religious believers view the image of the father in the family in association with the image of God. God and father are given opposing traits, such as being both merciful and authoritarian. Barakat also explores how Arabs have tried to unite the Moslem world by returning to the fundamentals of Islam. However, he sites the problem with this approach is that Arabs return to tradition and the past. Barakat concludes "what religion lacks in the contemporary context are a vision and a program for the future."

Halim Barakat provides an extensive well of information about the Middle East. He goes into careful detail about the Arab culture, family life, religion, politics, and more. Barakat has also done an excellent job of debunking the myths that some orientalists and westerners hold about Arabs. He uses many factual examples about the Arab world with an unbiased approach. Barakat proves that careful examination of various credible sources will bring true knowledge and wisdom, rather than relying upon quick and superficial stereotypes. www.reemcreations.com

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update:Why Did Bush Take My Job?
By Saeb Erekat
Sunday, April 25, 2004; Page B07
JERUSALEM -- President Bush apparently has taken my job.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39885-2004Apr24.html
 

Until the Bush-Sharon press conference on April 14, I was the chief negotiator for the Palestine Liberation Organization, the only internationally recognized entity that has a mandate to negotiate a permanent peace with Israel. But then Bush appeared on television, standing at the White House next to a beaming Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, and announced that he had accepted Israel's claim to illegally occupied Palestinian land. He further determined that Palestinian refugees would never be allowed to return to their homes in Israel and would instead have to be resettled in a Palestinian state, vast tracts of which he had just given away.
 
In so doing, Bush reneged on the 1991 U.S. Letter of Assurances provided to the Palestinians by his father's administration; the letter said that "no party should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine issues" and that "the United States has opposed and will continue to oppose settlement activity in the territories occupied in 1967." Bush, as the self-appointed Palestinian negotiator, finally exposed the "Middle East peace process" for the charade that it has become -- a mechanism by which Israel and the United States impose a solution on the Palestinians.
 
In this era of unmatched and unchallenged U.S. power, Bush abandoned America's historical role as facilitator and mediator of Middle East peace and instead simply adopted the positions of an expansionist, right-wing government in Israel.

  • It is mind-boggling that an American president, often citing the rule of law, would use the power of his position not to enforce international law against illegal Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory but instead to legitimize them as "currently existing Israeli population centers," thereby giving Israelis an incentive to build even more.
  • It is mind-boggling that a president who supports equality and non-discrimination would dismiss the rights of Christian and Muslim refugees to return to their homes in the "Jewish state" -- a term often repeated but never defined or even left to the parties to negotiate. And
  • It is mind-boggling that the leader of the free world, the president of a nation whose very existence is based on liberty and justice, would act so callously to deny liberty and justice to the Palestinian people. 

The positions taken by Bush are completely contrary to, and thus seriously undermine, the expressed objectives of American policy of democratic reform in the Middle East.

  • Freedom? Of course -- unless you are a Palestinian, in which case your rights must be approved by Israel.
  • The rule of law? Absolutely -- unless you are Israel, in which case you need not concern yourself with U.N. resolutions, the Fourth Geneva Convention, international refugee law or human rights treaties. 
  • Accountability? Without a doubt -- unless you are Ariel Sharon, in which case you may freely conduct assassinations, build walls and settlements, oppress an entire population and then be rewarded with unquestioning support. 

Bush wants to reform the Arab world while serving as the Washington franchise for an Israeli government bent on the expropriation of Palestinian land and the domination and humiliation of the Palestinian people. As long as the United States refuses to play an evenhanded role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as long as it continues to cede its Middle East policy to the Israeli government, U.S. efforts to win the war on terrorism are seriously undermined.
 
Israel's non-negotiated disengagement from Gaza will cause many Palestinians to conclude that violence, and not negotiations, is the only option for securing their rights. The majority of Palestinians who support a peaceful, negotiated two-state solution now see that Palestinians are no longer even welcome at the negotiating table. Israel is now negotiating peace with the United States -- not with the Palestinians. It is impossible to describe how deeply this has undermined Palestinian moderates, such as myself, who have continued to argue for a solution that is based on reconciliation and negotiation and not on revenge and retaliation.
 
The primary beneficiaries of these developments are extremist groups throughout the Middle East. The leaders of such groups could not have invented a better method of recruitment than the Bush-Sharon press conference. The reality is that as a result of the positions taken by the Bush administration, we are farther away from a permanent peace than we have ever been, and many innocent people on both sides will die in the coming months and years as a result.
 
My role as chief Palestinian negotiator may have been taken from me, but I retain my role as a Palestinian father. I am determined to teach my children that violence is not the answer. President Bush has not made my job any easier.
 
The writer is chief negotiator for the Palestine Liberation Organization.
© 2004 The Washington Post Company
Forwarded by
Raja Mattar